The definitive CIA report on Iraq and their WMD programs has been published and is available here. The most interesting thing about this report is that it will be read by those of all political persuasions and each will hold it up as proof that were right about Iraq.

On page 30 of Volume 3 (Warning: huge PDF file), there is the following graphic which indicates where and when chemical munitions have been found (click the image to see a full size version):

Here is the text from the lower left corner of the figure:

Since May 2004, ISG has recovered a total of 53 chemical weapons from various sources and military units throughout Iraq. A preliminary field assessment indicates they are port of Iraq's pre-1991 stockpile. Variations in size, type and agent fill raise the possibility that other, similar rounds remain at large.

I can already hear the two primary talking points:

1. These do not count because there are not enough of them. 53 weapons is not a stockpile.
2. These do not count because they are old. They appear to be procured/manufactured prior to Desert Storm. The fact that recent weapons have not been found indicates that Saddam was not a WMD threat.

Over and over we have heard the claims that we have found no weapons of mass destruction. How many does it take until none becomes some? My classical engineering background says anything to the right of zero on the number line. One hundredth is some while one is some in a greater manner. Fifty-three is not many, and much less than most people expected (myself included) but it is far from none.

As to point two, consider the following parable. A man is convicted for armed bank robbery. He is sentenced to time in prison and later paroled. One stipulation of his parole is that he cannot own or carry a firearm. Years later, an incident invokes a police search of his domicile and they find a gun. The felon insists that this weapon does not count because he had purchased it years before he had committed his crime and had put it away in his closet. The records do indicate that the gun was purchased years prior to the robbery. Has this man violated the terms of his probation?

In retrospect, it appears that Saddam tried to have it both ways. He presented an image of obstructing inspections and standing up to the UN. He made it appear that he had something to hide in order to garner respect from the other nations in the region. Yet it seems that he did destroy at least some of his illegal weapons - perhaps he felt the risk of being caught with them was too great.

Yet as I read the CIA report, I do find Saddam a declawed and defanged tiger. As I peruse page after page of the history of his quest for WMDs, I find one recurring label which applies to the deposed dictator: Threat.

Here is one telling passage from the reports (volume 3, page 11):

ISG believes that none of these events weakened Saddam’s resolve to possess a robust CW capability. Baghdad believed its need for chemical weapons was justified, based on its fear of hostilities with Iran and Israel. The Regime, we judge, was also motivated by an unstated desire to elevate its status among Arab nations. ISG believes that Saddam deferred but did not abandon his CW ambitions.

• Saddam implied, according to the former Presidential Secretary, that Iraq would resume WMD programs after sanctions in order to restore the “strategic balance” within the region and, particularly, against Israel.

I know everyone sees something different in this report. I'm well aware of my own biases, and you are free to write off my opinion if you choose. But my appraisal of this document is that it does very little to condemn President George W. Bush, and much to damn President Saddam Hussein (ret.).